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tool. The very ease of use that makes them appealing and powerful also requires a process
of enormous simplification that is not necessarily transparent to the end user.5
In addition to recognizing the potential of empirical research to transform the questions
we ask and the outputs we create, it is also time to begin having a serious discussion about
what makes for effective and rigorous empirical research in the field of international law.
Here, I would like to raise three issues: ethics, audience, and methodology.
The ethical questions follow directly from the transformative effect of empirical research
on our outputs. Particularly if we are producing tools that are meant to be used directly by
policymakers, we have an obligation to consider how those tools might be used or misused.
We may decide that it is unethical to produce some tools at all, if the potential for misuse
is too great. At a minimum, we must design our tools in such a way as to maximize the
likelihood of careful use.
Relatedly, there are questions of audience. To ensure that empirical research is performed
rigorously, we need to develop a community of international law scholars who can knowledge-
ably read and respond to empirical research and who can critique how it was performed.
Even though many scholars will have no interest in conducting empirical research themselves,
empirical researchers still need a critical mass of readers who are prepared to call us to
account. Also, for our research to be effective, and especially for policymakers to understand
the scope and limits of the tools we produce, we need to package and deliver our work so
that it reaches an audience beyond the academic world. Seventy-five-page law review articles,
dense with footnotes, are not an accessible vehicle; short papers, blogging, and meetings
with policymakers are more likely conduits.
Finally, I have heard law described as a discipline without a methodology, and indeed,
those of us who do empirical research typically borrow our methodologies from other
disciplines and adapt them to our own purposes. As a consequence, we have not yet had a
thorough intra-disciplinary discussion about the kinds of methods we consider appropriate
for international law. What techniques are needed to generate reliable data and to appropriately
correspond that data analytically to our theoretical concepts and policy goals? How should
the methods borrowed from other disciplines be tweaked to address legal subjects? I do not
expect that we will come to a single set of conclusions about these issues, but the discussion
itself will help to produce some criteria, albeit contested ones, against which to measure the
methods we use.
EMPIRICAL MODALITIES: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
By Susan Franck*
Empirical approaches add value to international investment law and aid in its evolution.
Nevertheless, we must "fit the forum to the fuss." When transforming international law,
we select proper methodologies for specific research questions and make international law
empiricism part of a larger post-structuralist, pluralist legal dialogue. In connection with
that, my remarks first place empirical research on international investment in a historical
context. I then discuss where the research is today and offer an example of how empirical
methods can be used to understand, reassess, and possibly transform international investment
'Id. at 20-21.
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law and related institutions. Finally, I consider the future of empirical research related to
international investment.
HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
The international political economy has always been a subject of academic interest. Yet
it was largely the province of political scientists and economists focusing on investment
flows. In 1967 the controversial article by Scaperlanda' focused on differences in U.S.
investment flows in Europe. Scaperlanda used econometric modeling to assess whether the
creation of an EC common market was reliably linked to the relocation of U.S. foreign
investment. Concluding that the data did not support a "reallocation theory," the research
helped elucidate how a normative change in international law and institutions-namely the
creation of the EEC-affected certain investment decisions.
Similarly, in the 1970s a case study of Columbia used qualitative interviews of 200
government officials to evaluate a new screening process for approving foreign investment
and the link to investment flows.2 The study's aim was not to educate domestic government
regulators or treaty negotiators; rather, it aided private parties' structuring of investment to
secure entry into the domestic Columbian market.
These two examples, which were not randomly selected, nevertheless reflect a common
theme. Namely, different research questions applied different empirical methods to illuminate
issues related to international investment. Both studies focused on variables affecting invest-
ment flows; they were descriptive and proscriptive; they were designed to aid the ordering
of private affairs. They did not address the normative choices about investment law and
related institutions.
THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE
To put matters into perspective, during a December 2009 conversation, Professor Scaper-
landa told me that empirical research in the 1960s and 1970s on international investment
law was necessarily constrained given lack of access to data and technological limitations.
Scaperlanda recalled that, to run a single regression, more than one room of computers, and
a day of computing time, might be required. The transformation of technology and the
increase in the availability of data create lower opportunity costs for conducting rigorous
empirical research and begin to reflect the shifting interest in international investment empiri-
cism. The rise of social science methodologies, non-state actors, and international institutions
and technological innovation arguably creates a complex interaction that generates opportuni-
ties to reconsider how international law can and should operate; and this could involve using
empirical methods to offer a different analytical framework for traditional units of analysis.
At present, empirical scholarship on international investment law has two core focuses.
One aspect is more traditional. Like its historical predecessors, it focuses on which variables
facilitate international investment and how to maximize that value through normative legal
choices. What legal scholars add to the mix is encouraging the rigorous analysis of: (1)
international agreements, like investment treaties; (2) domestic legal regimes related to
investment; and (3) issues of scale related to those legal institutions. Lawyers have also
encouraged political scientists and economists to enhance their methodological approaches
1 Anthony Scaperlanda, The E.E.C. and U.S. Foreign Investment: Some Empirical Evidence, 77 EcON. J. 22(1967).
2 Francois J. Lombard, Screening Foreign Direct Investment in LDCs: Empirical Findings of the Columbian
Case (1967-1975), 9 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 66 (1978).
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by having a more accurate understanding of legal doctrine, the practical operation of law
and the implications for creating meaningful variables with measurement validity. In other
words, investment law scholars have added the "law" as a variable to the model of what
affects foreign investment flows. To this end, I would point to the scholarship of Jason
Yackee, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Andrew Guzman, and others. This research essentially
considers the legal implications for "how do you get international investment?" or what I
call investment facilitation research.
Another aspect of investment research focuses on "what happens once you have it?"-
which I call the investment implication research. This research explores the functionality of
international investment law regimes in order to assess the system and its affiliated costs.
This is the scholarship that, in the tradition of Marc Galanter's assessment of U.S. litigation
myths, descriptively offers a critique of purported truisms about international investment. It
is also scholarship that assesses those variables associated with outcome-and how the
background of adjudicators of international investment law may (or may not) skew results.
In the future it might grow even further-it might consider other areas of analysis beyond
pure outcomes. It could grow to encompass larger process concerns (i.e., the role of third
parties or mass claims), the implications for enforcement, good governance structures, domes-
tic capacity-building, and the role of the rule of law. The ultimate goal of this scholarship
is to inform normative policy choices and make recommendations for systemic improvements
to investment law and associated international institutions.
The Specific Example
This research might be best illustrated through a concrete example. Some Latin American
countries have critiqued the process of resolving international investment disputes as biased
in favor of the developed world and that governments (except the United States) always lose.
The implications of this are not insignificant. It has lead to: (1) the withdrawal of Bolivia
and Ecuador from the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),
a dispute resolution institution established by an international convention; (2) statements by
ALBA 3 about the possible creation of an alternative international arbitration body; and (3) the
withdrawal by states, such as Russia and Ecuador, from multilateral and bilateral international
investment agreements. The phenomenon is not isolated; some South African officials have
indicated that they will not sign international investment treaties that contain provisions to
arbitrate before ICSID, particularly where they are primarily the capital-importing state.
So what does empirical analysis have to add to this debate? It permits the assessment of
dispute resolution "myths" and the accuracy of conventional wisdom. It can also aid the
considered construction and revision of international investment law.
Current data did not back up the claim that governments always lose. One set of pre-2007
data and measures suggested that governments won a bit more than fifty percent of the time.
Meanwhile, the data did not suggest that it is catastrophic when governments do lose.
Although this is likely to evolve as further data are coded and analyzed, the data indicated
that amounts awarded by tribunals were in the order of US$10 million. But that is not to
say that there is no cause for concern. The data also showed that the average amounts claimed
were in the order of US$343 million, which is perhaps why-looking at that potential
3 Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra Amirica-Bolivia, Cuba, Dominicana, Ecuador, Honduras,
Nicaragua, San Vicente y las Granadinas, Venezuela y Bolivia (Oct. 2, 2009), at http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-
ecuador/alba-evalua-creacion-de-tribunal-de-arbitraje-que-reemplace-al-ciadi-37108
6 .html.
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exposure, plus associated costs of pursuing arbitration-that stakeholders complain about
the rules of this high-stakes game.4
Overall, based upon on the preliminary models, the data did not find bias in the system,
which seems to suggest that the system is not functioning unreasonably, but there is room
for improvements at the margins or in specific subsets. Likewise, the data did not back up
the assertion that the development background of the respondent state had a reliable statistical
relationship with losing or amounts awarded. While replication and convergence of research
is necessary (with more data and more nuanced models), this initial evidence contradicts the
claim that the developing world is unfairly treated through the process of resolving investment
disputes through arbitration. The initial evidence suggests that there is no reliable evidence
demonstrating the arbitration system is biased; it also suggests that the "remedy" ALBA
proposes to address the investment "problem" may not be properly tailored to address its
underlying concerns.
This is a classic example of how "international law matters." Governments created legal
frameworks on international investment. International bodies have begun to interpret the
meaning of those structures; and those decisions are being implemented and enforced. Govern-
ments, investors, and civil society groups react to those processes and recommend adjustments
to affect the future of the international investment law regime. Empirical methods, adapted
to the specific research question and implemented properly, offer a vital-but not the only-
tool to evaluate the present and create structures to promote the long-term sustainability of
the international investment system.
CONCLUSION
The international investment system is evolving during a time of global economic crisis.
I believe that there are several implications that will affect the future evolution of international
investment law empiricism and the creation of international economic law and related institu-
tions. First, we should expand research to address systemic evolution of the data. This may
require expansion and consolidation of existing data sets to account for new experiences and
look for points of historical demarcation. Second, we should be ready to entertain different
types of research-whether quantitative, qualititative, or mixed methods. One size may not
fit all; different units of analysis may require different approaches; and scholars should select
the right methods to answer specific research questions. Third, we should ensure that data
gathering and analysis are done rigorously in conformity with accepted social science prac-
tices. Without an explanation of methodological choices, it is difficult to assess the validity
of the data and the inferences derived therefrom. Fourth, scholars should provide research
in a format that encourages policymakers to use the data and inferences appropriately.
Research is not about creating sound bites but providing nuanced information bound by
context and respectful of methodological limitations. Finally, we should consider now how
to build long-term longevity of investment law empiricism-whether by conducting meta-
analysis, training empirical methodologists, or encouraging strategic collaboration across
disciplines. In these ways we can support the proper growth, use, and understanding of
empirical methodologies to gain the maximum benefits from international investment and
the associated legal frameworks.
4 Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes ofInvestment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 436 (2009).
